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خبرنگار: «آیا رهبران کشورهای عربی و اسرائیل تو را قانع کردند به ایران حمله نکنی؟»
ترامپ:
️ «کسی من رو قانع نکرده. خودم خودم رو قانع میکنم. قرار بود بیش از ۸۰۰ نفر رو دار بزنند. کسی رو دار نزدند. لغو کردند. خیلی تاثیرش زیاد بود.» khabarmohem.ir @Khabar_Fouri
ترامپ:
️ «کسی من رو قانع نکرده. خودم خودم رو قانع میکنم. قرار بود بیش از ۸۰۰ نفر رو دار بزنند. کسی رو دار نزدند. لغو کردند. خیلی تاثیرش زیاد بود.» khabarmohem.ir @Khabar_Fouri۲۱:۴۴
The issue poses the question: What comes after the end of the U.S.-led global order? Pundits and political scientists have long anticipated the end of the United States’ unipolar era and the rise of a more multipolar order. Though U.S. President Donald Trump is often cited as an accelerant in this process, the reality is that he has given rise to something altogether different. Leading voices Amitav Acharya, Kelly Sims Gallagher, Rebecca Lissner, Erin D. Dumbacher, Adam Posen, and Rishi Iyengar offer sharp analysis on what the abdication of U.S. leadership means for global challenges such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberthreats, and trade.
۶:۲۸
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-2025-year-in-review
Key Takeaways
Trump vs. BidenThe Trump administration added 1,322 persons to the SDN List and 143 persons to the Entity List in 2025. This marks a significant decrease from 2024, in which the Biden administration added 3,135 persons to the SDN List and 523 persons to the Entity List.
RussiaThe Trump administration designated just 74 Russian persons on the SDN List and did not add any Russian persons to the Entity List in 2025, a dramatic decrease in the volume of economic pressure aimed at Russia—though the existing sanctions regime was kept largely intact, and the administration sanctioned two major Russian energy companies.
IranAs part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to reimpose “maximum pressure” on Iran, the majority of U.S. financial sanctions in 2025 were issued under authorities aimed at countering malign Iranian activities. Most Iran-related designations targeted Iranian evasion networks based outside of Iran.
ChinaChinese persons accounted for the largest number of SDN List designations (predominantly for their role in Iran sanctions evasion) and Entity List additions last year. This continues a five-year trend of the People’s Republic of China being a primary target of U.S. economic statecraft, despite Washington’s recent efforts to reach a trade deal with Beijing.
Nonstate actorsIn 2025, a considerable number of the Trump administration’s sanctions targeted nonstate actors, particularly persons engaging in or facilitating drug trafficking and cybercrime. The administration has frequently portrayed transnational crime, and drug trafficking groups in the Western Hemisphere in particular, as among the among the gravest threats to U.S. national security.
Continuity in other programsTrends in the use of other sanctions programs have persisted across administrations. Annual designations under nonproliferation, global terror, and drug trafficking authorities have increased dramatically across both the Biden and second Trump administrations, reflecting that certain national security challenges have received bipartisan attention.
@fpwatch
Key Takeaways
Trump vs. BidenThe Trump administration added 1,322 persons to the SDN List and 143 persons to the Entity List in 2025. This marks a significant decrease from 2024, in which the Biden administration added 3,135 persons to the SDN List and 523 persons to the Entity List.
RussiaThe Trump administration designated just 74 Russian persons on the SDN List and did not add any Russian persons to the Entity List in 2025, a dramatic decrease in the volume of economic pressure aimed at Russia—though the existing sanctions regime was kept largely intact, and the administration sanctioned two major Russian energy companies.
IranAs part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to reimpose “maximum pressure” on Iran, the majority of U.S. financial sanctions in 2025 were issued under authorities aimed at countering malign Iranian activities. Most Iran-related designations targeted Iranian evasion networks based outside of Iran.
ChinaChinese persons accounted for the largest number of SDN List designations (predominantly for their role in Iran sanctions evasion) and Entity List additions last year. This continues a five-year trend of the People’s Republic of China being a primary target of U.S. economic statecraft, despite Washington’s recent efforts to reach a trade deal with Beijing.
Nonstate actorsIn 2025, a considerable number of the Trump administration’s sanctions targeted nonstate actors, particularly persons engaging in or facilitating drug trafficking and cybercrime. The administration has frequently portrayed transnational crime, and drug trafficking groups in the Western Hemisphere in particular, as among the among the gravest threats to U.S. national security.
Continuity in other programsTrends in the use of other sanctions programs have persisted across administrations. Annual designations under nonproliferation, global terror, and drug trafficking authorities have increased dramatically across both the Biden and second Trump administrations, reflecting that certain national security challenges have received bipartisan attention.
@fpwatch
۱۲:۳۳
https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/irans-natural-gas-paradox-vast-resources-limited-export-capacity/
Iran appears to be a natural gas giant, due to its large proved gas reserves and significant gas production and consumption. However, this apparent abundance masks deep structural constraints: years of sanctions have hampered Iran’s ability to increase supply to meet both growing domestic gas demand and export commitments. As a result, Iran exports gas by pipeline to several neighboring countries but is often regarded as an unreliable supplier because exports are repeatedly curtailed during periods of domestic stress. Sanctions could also result in current importers having to stop imports.
@fpwatch
Iran appears to be a natural gas giant, due to its large proved gas reserves and significant gas production and consumption. However, this apparent abundance masks deep structural constraints: years of sanctions have hampered Iran’s ability to increase supply to meet both growing domestic gas demand and export commitments. As a result, Iran exports gas by pipeline to several neighboring countries but is often regarded as an unreliable supplier because exports are repeatedly curtailed during periods of domestic stress. Sanctions could also result in current importers having to stop imports.
@fpwatch
۱۳:۱۲
https://www.hudson.org/iran-dirty-bomb-us-forces-radioactive-warfare-ain-al-asad-2020-can-kasapoglu
Various US servicemembers serving at Ain al-Asad at the time of the January 2020 attacks have reported symptoms consistent with traumatic brain injury, with the number of diagnosed cases increasing steadily. Concerns of radiation fallout have emerged over time. Personnel stationed at the base were issued dosimeters, and monitoring protocols were introduced to track their potential exposure.3 Further medical assessments of exposed servicemembers—ranging from elevated risks of thyroid cancer to documented neuropsychiatric and personality changes—suggest that Iran may have indeed used a radiological weapon. The United States and its allies therefore need to treat the incident as a potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), for which Washington should apply a rigorous, zero-tolerance threshold. The absence of immediate fatalities cannot shield the Islamic Republic from accountability.
----------@fpwatch
Various US servicemembers serving at Ain al-Asad at the time of the January 2020 attacks have reported symptoms consistent with traumatic brain injury, with the number of diagnosed cases increasing steadily. Concerns of radiation fallout have emerged over time. Personnel stationed at the base were issued dosimeters, and monitoring protocols were introduced to track their potential exposure.3 Further medical assessments of exposed servicemembers—ranging from elevated risks of thyroid cancer to documented neuropsychiatric and personality changes—suggest that Iran may have indeed used a radiological weapon. The United States and its allies therefore need to treat the incident as a potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), for which Washington should apply a rigorous, zero-tolerance threshold. The absence of immediate fatalities cannot shield the Islamic Republic from accountability.
----------@fpwatch
۱۳:۰۹
تحلیلبه نظر من مذاکرات از سمت هر دو طرف تاکتیکی است. آمریکا میخواست بهانهای به دست بیاره که بدون غلط زیادی و بدون آبروریزی، بساط سازوبرگ نظامیاش را جمع کنه و بره عقب؛ ایران هم با توجه به اهمیت تمدنیِ توجه به همسایهها (درخواستهای مکرر همسایهها برای مذاکره و گفتوگو) و حفظ حرمت محله (جنگ نشدن در غرب آسیا)، قبول کرد که مذاکره بکنه. این تصمیم ایران البته حداقل دو کاربرد خفن داره: از طرفی، ظاهراً تدبیری کرده که شبح جنگ را از سر کشور دور کنه (چون این به اندازهی خود جنگ و بلکه بیشتر، برای کشور ضرر داره) و از طرفی، با همهی همسایهها و کشورهای منطقه اتمام حجت کرده. در چنین شرایطی، حفظ هوشیاری نظامی و امنیتی و کنشهای فعالانهی نظامی (رزمایش، رونمایی و...) باید مرتباً در دستور کار باشه.در این میان، غربگراها هم دوباره کمی قند تو دلشون آب شد که البته از نظر نظام، اهمیتی نداره. آنها تأثیری در تصمیم اخیر کشور نداشتند و بعداً هم به نظرم نخواهند داشت.
----------@fpwatch
۱۹:۳۱
